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Abstract
Literature on value co-creation often postulates that a greater degree of
co-production increases the potential of value co-creation. To test this hypoth-
esis, we build a computational model of value proposition inspired by March’s
model of organizational learning (1991[24]). The model allows to represent
various cases of co-creation: (i) without co-production, (ii) with downstream
co-production, and (iii) with upstream co-production. Repeated simulations
are partly supporting the literature. On one hand, we find that deeper in-
volvement of consumers into the value offering process increases the potential
for value co-creation. One the other hand, we find that co-production can
increase inequalities of satisfaction among consumers. Also, while scenarios
with learning consumers offer the highest potential for value co-creation, a
negative relationship emerges between the number of learning consumers and
organizational performance.
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1 Introduction
All adaptive systems include performance measures used by microeconomic
agents to make decisions (Holland and Miller, 1991[13]; Holland, 1975[12]).
Companies are no different. They use a wide and evolving variety of such
measures: profit, market share, return on equity, etc. A new one that is being
advocated by scholars of service science is value co-creation, that is the satis-
faction experienced by consumers while they are using the goods or services
they bought (Vargo and Lusch, 2004[35]).
Vargo et al. (2008[36]) argue that previous performance indicators were
based on prices, thus fundamentally on a criterion of "exchange value", while
the co-creation approach focuses on the idea of "use-value". In this new frame-
work, companies are not selling products, but a proposition of value consisting
in "a clear, simple statement of the benefits, both tangible and intangible, that
the company will provide" (Lanning and Michaels, 1988[16]). This promise
becomes actual value once a consumer bought the product, experienced it and
compared the resulting satisfaction felt with the initial promise (Vargo et al.,
2008[36]).
While use-value is necessarily co-created, the value offering does not need
to be co-produced. Indeed, consumers can always formulate a judgement
about an offering, regardless of their level of involvement in its making pro-
cess. On this respect, Ballantyne et al. (2011[2]) and Osborne and Strockosch
(2013[32]) - among others - put forth that potential of value co-creation is
higher when co-production deepens. This hypothesis is debatable. Organi-
zations are complex systems made of numerous and highly interdependent
actors (Carley and Hill, 2001[5]), whose capacity of adaptation is also influ-
enced by pre-existing routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982[30]). In a learning
perspective, co-producing the value offering may confront employees to con-
tradictions between consumers’ aspirations and the practices and values of
their organization. Such contradiction may hamper adequate customization
of the offering, therefore reducing its use-value potential.
The relationship between co-production of the offering and co-creation
of the use-value is thus not straightforward. It needs to be tested. In this
paper, we investigate this question by building-on a simulation model of or-
ganizational learning and value co-creation in various configurations of co-
production.
Repeated simulations partly confirm the hypothesis found in the co-creation
literature. Indeed, we find that deeper modes of co-production increase the
potential of value co-creation. However, it also appears that co-production
increases inequalities of satisfaction in cases where consumers are not learn-
ing from their interactions with the organization. Finally, we find a negative
relationship between the number of learning consumers and the potential of
value co-creation. Such learning indeed makes the environment more unstable
for the firm.
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The rest of the paper is organized in four parts. In section 2, we re-
view models of organizational learning and choose the one proposed by March
(1991[24]). In Section 3, we adapt this model to account for value co-creation
in various configurations of co-production. Section 4 presents and discusses
simulation results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 ExistingModels of Organizational Learn-
ing
In this section, we review existing models of organizational learning with the
objective of finding one that can be amended to account for value co-creation.
In a learning perspective, organizations are adaptive systems: they adapt
their decision rules - or routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982[30]) - when per-
formance is deemed unsatisfactory. March and Olsen (1975[26]) conceptualize
the organizational learning process in the form of a cycle in which individuals
learn from observations of their environment. This learning produces individ-
ual actions, which lead to organizational actions, and ultimately to responses
from the environment and so on. According to the authors, this cycle is of-
ten incomplete for many reasons: individuals can find it difficult to transform
their learning into actions, these actions do not necessarily generate change
at the organizational level, causalities in environmental reactions might be
unclear, and individuals’ observations of the environment are often subjective.
It follows that organizations are imperfectly co-evolving with their external
environment (Dixon, 1999[9]; McKelvey, 1999[27]), and their employees (Kim,
1993[15]). Organizational learning is thus inherently a nested - multilevel -
and imperfect process. Such complexity renders the search process far from
optimal (Cyert and March, 1963[7]) and path dependent (Levitt and March,
1988[21]).
According to Lant and Mezias (1990[17]), models of organizational learn-
ing are built around three blocs: (i) an organization targets a certain level of
performance, (ii) organizational change is triggered when performance does
not reach the target, and (iii) change is achieved through a search process.
A vast number of models of organizational learning exist in the literature,
but not all are suitable for investigating interlinks with co-creation of value.
Indeed, since co-creation opens up the learning process of the organization
to consumers, the chosen model should include channels for co-evolutionary
adaptation with them. Also, micro-foundations of the learning process at the
employee’s level seem necessary for representing such co-evolution.
In the framework proposed by Lant and Mezias (1990[17]), organizations
are represented by four binary dimensions - thus accounting for 16 types of
firms. Performance level of each dimension is set up at random at the start of
a simulation, but changed once later on for testing firms’ reaction to external
shocks. Three search routines are modeled: (i) the "adaptive" search takes
3
the form of a systematic search for a better fit organizational form, (ii) the
"institutional" search consists in imitating better performing firms, and (iii)
the "garbage can" search is a random search process. Finally, the target level
of performance is defined by a dynamic equation.
This model has the advantage of adopting a co-evolutionary perspective.
Indeed, the organization takes its competitors into account when searching,
which influences in return these same competitors in their own searches. Lomi
et al. (2010[23]) also propose a model in which an entrepreneur learns from
its competitors. This kind of co-evolution is however not of the type we are
aiming for. In a co-creation lens, attention should be given to co-evolution of
organizational practices with users’ needs, instead of with competitors. An-
other limit of Lant and Mezias’s framework (1990[17]) is that the learning
process being presented is not multilevel. Bruderer and Singh (1996[4]) put
forth that such multi-level learning is absent in many models studying the evo-
lution of ecologies of search strategies (Levinthal, 1997[19]; Lant and Mezias,
1992[18]; Mezias and Glynn, 1993[28]), in particular in those based on genetic
algorithms, in which entities are often passive as change occurs from one gen-
eration to another within this class of models (Bruderer and Singh, 1996[4];
Mitchell, 1998[29]). A co-creation perspective rather requires to unveil how
learning takes place within the organization (Payne et al., 2008[33]).
An unveiling of the micro-foundations of organizational learning is pro-
posed by Carley and Hill (2001[5]). They define organizations as "composed
of intelligent adaptive agents" (p. 63). The model takes the form of a "meta-
network" composed by two types of nodes - agents and knowledge bits - with
links between them. This meta-network thus accounts for three inter-related
sub-networks: a social network connecting the agents, an information net-
work connecting knowledge nodes, and a knowledge network linking agents
and knowledge. Agents acquire new knowledge by entering in interaction with
others that have access to different knowledge. In this framework, establish-
ment of new connexions define learning, and the organization’s performance
is measured by its degree of accuracy in hypothesizing on the composition of
a string of binary numbers.
Carley and Hill (2001[5]) thus present organizational learning as a nested
process occurring on intertwined networks, but without feedback loops with
higher levels of aggregation. Hence, the organization itself does not influence
agents’ behaviors and trajectory in terms of knowledge acquisition - apart
from the fact that this acquisition is conditioned by the other agents of the
organization. Breslin (2014[3]) also proposes a micro-founded model of or-
ganizational learning in which employees are operating within social groups.
In this framework, each employee makes a value proposition. The group’s
proposition is an average of its members’ propositions, and the company’s
offering is then an average of all groups’ propositions. The company’s offering
is then assessed by consumers on the basis of their preferences. The closer the
proposition is to consumers’ preferences, the higher the performance. This
performance measure is close to the idea of value co-creation, but there is still
no feedback between the organization and its employees: it is as if employees’
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learning was not conditioned by the organization’s pre-existing routines.
For Dixon (1999[9]), this is the presence of a "storeroom where the men-
tos of the past are kept" (p. 48) that makes the process of organizational
learning history-dependent. Organizations thus pass on norms, routines and
"perceived truth" (March, 1991[24] p.74) to employees. Such feedback from
the top is absent from the models reviewed so far, but it is at the heart of the
one proposed by March (1991[24]). This model is composed of four elements:
• An "organizational code of received truth" (p. 74) composed of m di-
mensions is initially set-up with null values.
• A vector of m binary characteristics (i.e. 1 or −1) stands as the "reality".
• The organization is employing n individuals, each with his/her vector of
beliefs regarding the reality - initially filled at random with 0, 1 or −1
values.
• A process of mutual learning in which every employee is adapting his/her
beliefs to non-null dimensions of the code with a probability p1. At the
same time, the organization is adapting its code to the beliefs of the
employees which are matching more closely the reality than does the
code. For a given dimension, the code is modified in accordance with the
belief of the majority k of the well-informed employees with a probability
(1− p2)k.
March (1991[24]) then augments this model to take into account employee’s
heterogeneity and turn-over, as well as instability of the environment - via ran-
dom changes in the vector of reality. One of the main results is the importance
of faster learning rate of the organization (i.e. high p2) compared with the one
of its employees (i.e. low p1). Indeed, if employees are fast to get socialized
to the code, then the organization cannot learn anymore from them. This re-
lationship between p1, p2 and the knowledge level of the organizational code
in March’s model is exemplified in Figure 1.1
This model has been mobilized in many conceptual contributions (see for
instance Levinthal and March, 1993[20], Crossan et al., 1999[6]), but - as
stated by Kane and Alavi (2007[14] p. 798) "surprisingly little work has ex-
tended the original model". The present review has highlighted the qualities
of this model with regards to both processes of learning and value co-creation.
In a learning perspective, it incorporates a feedback loop between employ-
ees and their organization’ memory, making the whole process complex and
history-dependent, while in a value co-creation perspective, the organization’s
performance is based on correspondence with a vector of reality, which could
be extended to represent consumers’ preferences, as in Breslin (2014[3]). It
is not denied that March (1991[24]) is also facing limitations. In particular,
this model ignores social networks among employees within the organization,
while such networks are playing a role in organizational learning (Carley and
Hill, 2001[5]; Breslin, 2014[3]). This remark highlights that finding the right
1All models presented in this paper have been programmed in C + +. Source codes can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
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level of simplification is a difficult issue in model building. Since the discussion
carried out thus far highlighted that core channels of organizational learning
were the interplay between employees and their organization, as well as with
the external environment, we propose to keep the question of social networks
for future studies and to proceed by extending March’s model.
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Figure 1: Relationship between employees’ learning rate (p1), the organization’s
learning rate (p2) and its equilibrium knowledge score - i.e. the degree of corre-
spondence between the organizational code and the reality - in March (1991[24]).
Authors’ calculations, averages over 30 simulations.
3 A computational model of organizational
learning and value co-creation
The model we are proposing is a computational model, and it views orga-
nizations as composed of interacting agents. Such modeling technic, often
referred to as "agent-based modelling" (Arthur, 2015[1] p.xv) allows to tackle
non-linearity emanating from feedback loops occurring both among agents
and with aggregate variables of the system being modelled. One advantage of
agent-based modelling is that it allows to uncover microeconomic conditions
which are sufficient for generating certain observable aggregate phenomena
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996[11]). Such models hence constitute a valuable tool
for theory discovery (Epstein, 2008[10]).
Aside from being a technical aid in performing complex computing, agent-
based models permit to extend the number of questions to be addressed by
management scholars and other social scientists. As such, March (2001[25])
highlights that these models allow to handle two new classes of problems,
namely those of "ecological (contextual) complexity" and "historical (tempo-
ral) complexity" (p. xv-xvi). Respectively, these problems concern the linking
of aggregate results with specific sets of interactions within populations - or
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ecologies - of microeconomic agents, and the study of path dependence, that
is the dependence of current results to past courses of events. Note that these
two problems are themselves defining characteristics of the notion of organi-
zational learning (Levitt and March, 1988[21]; March and Olsen, 1975[26]).
In what follows, we augment March (1991[24]) with elements of value co-
creation and co-production.
3.1 Implementing value co-creation in March (1991)
We propose to use the model of March (1991[24]) as a baseline for representing
a process of value co-creation under various conditions of co-production. In an
organizational learning perspective, value co-creation is a change in the perfor-
mance measure used for triggering organizational change. Value co-creation
starts with a proposition of value, or value offering. Compared with a goods-
dominant logic (Vargo et al., 2008[36]) in which a firm focuses on producing
and selling a material product, a value (or service-dominant) perspective im-
poses to "adopt a very sophisticated eye on the customer" (Levitt, 2004[22]
p.139). The objective is to propose a "clear, simple statement of the benefits,
both tangible and intangible, that the company will provide" (Lanning and
Michaels, 1988[16] p. 53).
Arguably, such statement would be more easily understood by consumers if
the organizational code is compatible with their aspirations. We thus propose
to use the organizational code in March’s model (1991[24]) as a proxy for value
offering. We also replace the vector of reality by a population of individual
consumers, each with his/her own vector of aspirations of m dimensions - ini-
tially filled at random with 1 and −1 values. Without co-producing the value
offering with consumers, the overall learning process is not affected by these
modifications: employees still adopt non-null dimensions of the code with a
probability p1, and the code adopts the majority opinion among the better in-
formed employees with a probability (1−p2)k , with k the share of this opinion
among the considered employees. Correspondence between employees’ beliefs
and consumers’ aspirations is assessed relatively to majority’s aspirations for
each dimension m. The only difference with March’s framework is thus that
the vector of reality has been replaced by a vector of majority opinions among
consumers. Hence, without co-production, the two models are equivalent, and
we will see later in this text that they bring similar results (see the signs as-
sociated with p1 and p2 in Table 3).
In its present form, the model highlights that co-creation is merely a shift of
perspective in which a unique reality is replaced by individual consumers’ as-
pirations. So far, the organization in the model is not using this new diversity
on the demand side for adapting its value offering. However, a finer knowledge
of these aspirations could be gained - and used - through co-production, that
we include in the model in the next subsection.
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3.2 Co-production of the value offering
As examplified in existing typologies, value offerings can be co-produced in
different manners. A first one consists in involving consumers at the oper-
ational stage, mainly for gathering information about their needs and aspi-
rations. A second manner consists in engaging consumers in the making of
the value offering through reciprocal negotiations (Ballantyne et al., 2011[2];
Osborne and Strokosch, 2013[32]; Osborne et al., 2016[31]). Both types of
co-production can have consequences on learning processes as they introduce
new channels for co-evolutionary learning (Dixon, 1999[9]) between employees
and consumers. Indeed, consumers’ implication in the operational stage could
modify employees’ beliefs, while reciprocal negotiation could also trigger a
learning process among consumers and affect their own aspirations - making
them more or less able to understand value propositions made by the organi-
zation. We represent these two cases in the following.
3.2.1 Organizational learning with downstream co-production
of value
In this configuration, employees are surveying consumers about their aspira-
tions. This activity provides them with a new source of information, which
can potentially enter in contradiction with information coming from the orga-
nization’s existing value offering practices. We thus code two variants of the
model: a conservative setting in which employees give priority to their social-
ization within the organization, and a progressive setting in which employees
favor consumers’ opinions over the organization’s practices. Employees’ learn-
ing in these two scenarios is detailed in Figure 2.
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Employee
Progressive?
U(0,1)<p3?
No
Yes
Yes
Survey N users
Organizational
Code
Employee’s 
beliefs
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the code with a probability p1
if different from beliefs
Majority aspirations
Users’ aspirations
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the majority opinion with a
probability p4 if different from
beliefs
Employee’s beliefs
No
Survey N users
Organizational
Code
Employee’s 
beliefs
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the code with a probability p1
if different from beliefs
Majority aspirations
Users’ aspirations
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the majority opinion with a
probability p4 if different from
beliefs
Employee’s beliefs
U(0,1)<p3?
Yes No
Organizational
Code
Employee’s 
beliefs
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the code with a probability p1
if different from beliefs
Figure 2: *
Employee’s search procedure with co-production.
In this Figure, U(0; 1) stands for a random draw in a uniform distribution defined
in the interval [0; 1].
In a progressive setting (left side of Figure 2), each employee decides with a
probability p3 to survey N consumers chosen at random2 - with N the closest
integer to a proportion δ of the entire population of consumers. By doing so,
the employee builds a matrix of a size N × m which summarizes opinions of
the surveyed individuals. Then he/she builds a vector representing the ma-
jority opinions emerging from this matrix on the basis of a simple majority
rule. This vector is then compared with the employee’s beliefs, and any dif-
ference is adopted by this later with a probability p4. On the other hand, if
consumers are not surveyed - that is when the condition p3 is not met - then
employees’ learning procedure found in March (1991[24]) applies: each dimen-
sion of the value offering/ organizational code is adopted with a probability p1.
In a conservative case (right side of Figure 2), employees’ learning pro-
cedure is very similar to the one above, except that when consumers are
surveyed, any majority belief adopted by the employee has a probability p1 of
being switched back into the organization’s practice if different.
3.2.2 Organizational learning with upstream co-production of
value
In this variant of the model, employees of the organization still survey a share
δ of randomly chosen consumers and learn from them through the mechanisms
2Higher p3 values indicate a more systematic consumers surveying by the organization.
9
triggered by parameters p3 and p4 (see Figure 2). However, consumers are not
anymore just sharing information about their aspirations. They now engage
in a knowledge exchange process in which they get to know employees’ beliefs.
Access to such knowledge initiates a learning process among consumers, which
we summarize in Figure 3.
User
Yes
No Action
No
Surveyed by M employees ?
Beliefs of the M employees
Majority beliefs
User’s aspirations
Comparison: adopt a dimension
of the majority beliefs with a
probability p5 if different from
aspirations
Figure 3: Employee’s search procedure with co-production.
For a given consumer, learning occurs only when he/she has been surveyed
by at least one employee during the current time step. In this case, a matrix
of size M × m - with M the number of contacting employees - is built by
the consumer.3 A simple majority rule allows to obtain a vector of majority
beliefs among these employees. The consumer then compares these majority
beliefs with his/her own aspirations. In case of a difference, employees’ ma-
jority belief is adopted by the consumer with a probability p5.
Because of this new channel of learning, consumers are now taking an ac-
tive part into the organization’s learning system, which takes the form of two
retroactive loops: the first loop is the one found in March’s model (1991[24])
between the organization and its employees, the second loop of learning is be-
tween employees and consumers. These loops are simultaneous, which makes
the overall outcome of the model difficult to predict. There is for instance
a risk that employees adopt consumers’ aspirations, while consumers adopt
simultaneously the employees’ beliefs. In this configuration, there would be
an exchange and adoption of opinions, without making the value offering any
closer to consumers’ aspirations. However, such a situation is unlikely for two
reasons. First, employees are controlling the direction of the learning process :
if they are progressive, then the organization’s value offering would approach
aspirations of consumers, while in presence of conservative employees, con-
sumers’ aspirations are the ones that would adapt to the company’s offering.
Secondly, independently of employees’ attitude (i.e. progressive or conserva-
tive), events are not necessarily equally likely in the model. Indeed, if for
instance p3 and p4 are higher than p5, then employees would learn more from
consumers than the opposite. Attention should hence be given to parameters’
3A consumer might be contacted by several employees in cases of repeated buying, or when
employees from different work units of an organization conduct distinct consumers’ surveys.
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influence on the performance of the firm when analysing outputs of the model.
4 Simulation Results
Like in Vargo et al. (2008[36]), we define the organization’s performance in a
co-creation context as the degree of matching between its proposition of value
and a vector of majority aspirations among consumers. This vector is of size
m, and each of its dimension is filled-in with the opinion shared by the ma-
jority of the consumers. By doing so, we make the assumption that the closer
the match, the higher the potential for value co-creation. This performance
is comparable to an average degree of consumers’ satisfaction. Consumers’
initial aspirations, as well as employees’ initial beliefs, are all setup at random.
This section starts with the analysis of the overall dynamics of the simu-
lated organization’s performance. Then, we investigate parameters’ influence
over this performance in all co-production configurations. Finally, we explore
the incidence of co-production on the dispersion of consumers’ satisfaction.
4.1 General behavior of the model
Examples of single simulation runs in different scenarios are provided in Figure
4. In these simulations and subsequent ones, the organization has 30 employ-
ees, there are 100 consumers, and m = 100 (i.e. the number of dimensions of
the value offering, of consumers’ aspirations and of employees’ beliefs).4
4Trials with different numbers of consumers have shown that the numbers of agents do not
influence simulation results.
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Figure 4: Evolution of the organization’s performance in single simulation runs.
Parameters are chosen as follows: March Case - p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5; Downstream
co-production cases - p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.7, p4 = 0.7, δ = 0.5; Upstream
co-production cases - p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.5, p3 = 0.7, p4 = 0.7, p5 = 0.7, δ = 0.5.
We observe in Figure 4 that modes of co-production seem to have sig-
nificant influence on the organization’s performance, since cases of upstream
co-production allow to attain equilibrium levels of performance that are close
to 1, against around 0.5 and 0.3 for cases of downstream co-production and
without co-production, respectively. These first simulation results are giving
support to the hypothesis of higher co-creation when co-production deepens.
Note however that, for each scenario, we have to test for the influence of
all combinations of parameters. Also, because of the number of parameters,
sensitivity analyses with 3D graphs like the one displayed in Figure 1 is not
a tractable option. Instead, since we observe the emergence of equilibrium
levels of performance long before t = 50 in Figure 4, we propose to analyze
the model’s outputs with the following Monte Carlo procedure, performed for
each scenario:5
• Draw parameters values at random in the intervals defined in Table 1.
• Run a simulation 50 time steps.
• Records the equilibrium performance level at t = 50 as well as parameters
values.
• Repeat 5000 times.6
Descriptive statistics of the resulting performance levels are provided in Ta-
ble 2. Average equilibrium performance increases from 0.371 in the scenario
without co-production, to above 0.53 and 0.92 with downstream and upstream
5Similar procedures for analyzing ouputs of agent-based models can be found in other papers,
see for instance Pyka and Fagiolo (2007[34]), and Desmarchelier and Fang (2016[8]).
6Regression results were found to be unaffected by the number of simulations above 3000 repe-
titions.
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co-production, respectively. This first observation is supporting the hypoth-
esis according to which co-production increases the (potential for) value co-
creation (Ballantyne et al., 2011[2]; Osborne and Strokosch, 2013[32]). Inter-
estingly, employees’ attitude (progressive or conservative) towards consumers’
aspirations is having at best only a marginal influence on the organization’s
performance. Also, standard deviation of performance levels is the lowest in
cases of downstream co-production. This result had to be expected, because in
this configuration employees are gathering information about consumers’ as-
pirations, which are maintained unchanged throughout simulation runs. High
kurtosis in all scenarios indicates that distributions of performance levels are
highly peaked. Interestingly, these distributions exhibit fat tails in the lower
values in all co-production scenarios (see the negative skewness coefficients
in Table 2), while the fat tail is in upper values of performance when there
is no co-production. It is thus possible to find higher performance without
co-production in some single simulation runs, which shows the importance of
using a repeated procedure prior to analyzing simulation results.
Parameter Value Definition
p1 [0.1, 0.9] Rate at which employees are learning from the organization.
p2 [0.1, 0.9] Learning rate of the organization.
p3 [0.1, 0.9] Probability to survey consumers.
p4 [0.1, 0.9] Rate at which employees are learning from consumers.
p5 [0.1, 0.9] Rate of consumers’ learning.
δ [0.1, 0.9] Share of consumers surveyed by employees.
Table 1: *
Parameters values
No co-production
Downstream co-production Upstream co-production
Conservative Progressive Conservative Progressive
Mean 0.371 0.533 0.534 0.928 0.960
Median 0.361 0.535 0.536 0.979 0.990
σ 0.047 0.008 0.007 0.099 0.076
Kurtosis 3.270 2.193 3.178 1.224 7.589
Skewness 1.850 −1.483 −1.568 −1.492 −2.802
Min 0.272 0.492 0.496 0.531 0.519
Max 0.524 0.550 0.549 1 1
Table 2: *
Descriptive statistics of the organization’s performance obtained through Monte Carlo
experiment.
4.2 Assessing parameters’ influence on organizational
performance
We now move to the study of the influence of parameters values on the or-
ganization’s levels of performance. For doing so, we regress equilibrium per-
formance levels over parameters values in each scenario. Results are provided
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in Table 3. We note at first that the constant term is increasing when co-
production deepens. This constant term provides an estimate of the average
organizational performance at time t = 50 when all parameters have minimum
values. Note however that these minimum values are set-up at 0.1 (see Table
1) and that we are at t = 50, so a learning process has already taken place.
We can thus interpret constant terms in Table 3 as the equilibrium level of the
average performance of the organization in presence of a minimum learning.
With regards to the functioning of the learning process itself, it is evident
that the relationship between employees’ socialization rate (p1), the organiza-
tion’s learning rate (p2) and performance levels is affected by the introduction
of co-production. Indeed, taking the no co-production case as a benchmark,
the negative influence of p1 is weakened in downstream co-production thanks
to the appearance of the new learning channel. p1 is even having a positive
influence on the organization’s performance when employees are progressive.
This is because, in this configuration, employees’ learning from existing or-
ganizational practices is complementing their learning from consumers (see
Figure 2). In cases of upstream co-production, consumers are also learning
from employees, hence their aspirations are now dynamic. It follows that the
organization needs to gather information about consumers, hence again the
negative role of p1. In such a dynamic environment, quick adaptation of the
value offering is a necessity, hence the relatively high p2 coefficient compared
with downstream co-production.
Regarding the influence of information gathering on organizational perfor-
mance, coefficients associated with parameters p3, p4 and δ are all positive
in downstream co-production. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that greater co-production increases value co-creation. Things are however
different in upstream co-production, that is when consumers are learning as
well from their interactions with employees. In this configuration, p3 and p4
are having even greater positive impact on performance, but δ - the share of
consumers surveyed by employees - is now having a negative effect. This phe-
nomenon is due to the fact that δ is the parameter that triggers consumers’
learning, thus it renders the external environment more unstable: the higher
δ, the larger the number of learning consumers. When consumers are learning,
they adopt employees’ beliefs with a probability p5 - which is having a posi-
tive effect on performance - but employees are in the meantime learning about
consumers’ aspirations. Since both sides are learning simultaneously, there is
a risk that both are exchanging their respective beliefs, without getting any
closer from each other. The surveying of consumers should thus be used with
parsimony, hence the negative δ in upstream co-production. It is therefore
appearent that in-depth co-production is not necessarily the best option for
the organization when confronted to learning consumers.
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No co-production
Downstream co-production Upstream co-production
Conservative Progressive Conservative Progressive
Const. 0.374(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.519(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.520(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.833(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.869(∗ ∗ ∗)
p1 −0.057(∗ ∗ ∗) −0.0006 0.002(∗ ∗ ∗) −0.069(∗ ∗ ∗) −0.026(∗ ∗ ∗)
p2 0.053(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.004(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.005(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.018(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.027(∗ ∗ ∗)
p3 0.004(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.005(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.016(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.053(∗ ∗ ∗)
p4 0.013(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.008(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.199(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.106(∗ ∗ ∗)
p5 0.044(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.044(∗ ∗ ∗)
δ 0.009(∗ ∗ ∗) 0.008(∗ ∗ ∗) −0.019(∗ ∗ ∗) −0.025(∗ ∗ ∗)
R2 0.206 0.297 0.267 0.358 0.238
Table 3: *
Robust regression estimates of the influence of parameters on the equilibrium
performance of the organization in the simulated scenarios.
∗ ∗ ∗ statistically significant at 1%
So far, we have measured the organization’s performance on the basis of
the correspondence between its value offering and majority aspirations of con-
sumers. In this sense, high performance does not prevent some consumers to
be disappointed with the value offering. We thus propose to assess the mer-
its of our various scenarios with respect to the dispersion of users’ satisfaction.
4.3 Co-production and users’ satisfaction
For a given consumer, satisfaction is measured by the degree of correspondence
between his/her aspirations and the value offering. When all consumers’ sat-
isfaction levels are known, it is possible to compute a standard deviation of
it. At each repetition of the Monte Carlo experiment, we compute and record
standard deviation of consumers’ satisfaction at t = 50. This provides us with
5000 values of dispersion in consumers’ satisfaction per scenario. Distribu-
tions of these values are provided in Figure 5.
In Figure 5, higher standard deviations (measured on the horizontal axis)
mean greater inequalities among consumers. Taking the scenario without
co-production as a benchmark, we observe that downstream co-production
has a tendency to generate higher dispersion in users’ satisfaction. Basi-
cally, consumers who have been surveyed by employees are satisfied by the
value offering, while the others remain disappointed. Hence, despite a greater
overall performance in the downstream case compared to when there is no co-
production (see Tables 2 and 3), this type of co-production can be inadequate,
especially if the organization is a public administration whose objective is to
treat citizens equally.
Upstream scenarios are producing a wider range of standard deviation val-
ues of consumers’ satisfaction, but they are virtually always inferior to those
produced by the other scenarios, including the one without co-production.
Involving consumers into the learning process thus appears as the surest way
to improve equality of treatment among them.
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Figure 5: Distributions of the standard deviations in consumers’ satisfaction per
scenario
5 Conclusion
It is often assumed that in-depth co-production increases the potential for
value co-creation. To test this hypothesis, we have built a computational
model of value offering inspired by the model of organizational learning pro-
posed by March (1991[24]). This allows to represent various cases of co-
creation: (i) without co-production, (ii) with downstream co-production, and
(iii) with upstream co-production. Each case complexifies further the orga-
nization’s learning system. Overall, simulation results are only partly sup-
porting the hypothesis of the co-creation literature. In one hand, we observe
higher organizational performance when consumers are getting more involved
into the making of the value offering, but on the other hand it was found that
downstream co-production augments inequalities among consumers. Also,
simulation results suggest that a relatively low number of consumers should
be involved in upstream co-production cases.
This paper highlights the proximity between concepts of value co-creation
and organizational learning. Indeed, both are modes of adaptation to a chang-
ing environment, whether it is made of competing companies or potential
clients. Adopting the point of view of organizational learning imposes to think
about co-creation in terms of retro-active loops as the organization can foster
change in consumers’ aspirations. Such a link is often absent from contribu-
tions in terms of value co-creation. On this matter, it is interesting to note
that the standard deviations we obtained in terms of consumers’ satisfaction
provide us with information about their opinion dynamics: downstream sce-
narios generate more polarized opinions, while upstream ones produce more
uniform opinions. Hence, in the present model, the mode of co-production
has a significant impact on the dynamics of users’ opinions. It would be in-
teresting to investigate the model’s behavior when augmented with a more
realistic model of opinion dynamics. In such a situation, would upstream co-
16
production necessarily lead to consensus and high organizational performance,
or would complex opinion dynamics undermine the good performances of the
organization?
Besides, value co-creation shows that a change of the indicator of perfor-
mance can affect significantly the organizational learning process by exposing
employees to conflicting information. At first sight, the two archetypal at-
titudes that have been modeled - i.e. conservative and progressive - were
having only a marginal effect on the overall performance of the organization,
but they had strong incidence on the different channels composing the learn-
ing cycle. For instance, the learning rate of the organization was found to
be non-significant in downstream co-production with conservative employees,
while it was positive and significant with progressive employees.
This conclusion echoes March and Olsen’s argument (1975[26]) that am-
biguity threatens the organization’s learning cycle by creating viscosities into
it. In a sense, changing the performance indicator creates uncertainties for
employees, which could hamper their adaptive capabilities and ultimately the
one of the organization. To put it another way, contributions in terms of value
co-creation often postulate that co-production with users would increase the
organization’s performance, but this might not be the case if the organiza-
tion’ learning cycle get paralyzed because of ambiguity and conflicting signals
coming from the new environment.
In general terms, organizational learning stands out as ubiquitous. Indeed,
changes in the organization’s performance measures and objectives, in its deci-
sion rules and routines, or affecting its environment (clients and competitors)
can affect its learning cycle. Consequences for this cycle can be disruptive:
loops of learning can switch from positive to negative, with unexpected conse-
quences on the overall performance of the organization. Like many scholars of
organizational learning whose contributions have been reviewed in this paper,
we believe that such complexity is propitious to the use and development of
simulation modelling.
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